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practice has been largely wasted because these products have not been 
widely taken up by producers (LWRRDC, 1993). The impact of the soft- 
ware on better decisions, greater competitiveness, or improved sustain- 
ability is only rarely documented, and there have been few attempts to 
quantify its effects. 
Interest in building agricultural DSSs has come primarily from the 
professional research community, although in several cases (including the 
original SIRATAC program, see below) there has been pressure from 
industry to bring the technology to market as quickly as possible. The 
pressure has arisen from the increasing demands for accountability in 
publicly-funded agricultural R&D programmes, which need a tangible 
product to indicate that something has been done. Further pressure has 
come from the move towards commercialisation of publicly-funded R&D, 
which is taken to mean the production of information packages which can 
be sold. In Australia, this has coincided with the redeployment of tradi- 
tional public sector extension officers, and the rise of regional information 
centres as (at least a partial) substitute for ‘one on one’ extension (Hanger 
& Vock, 1993). 
There are reasons for supposing that the expectation that farmers could 
usefully exploit DSS technology to improve their own practice is seriously 
flawed. First, the design and presentation of DSSs are sufficiently complex 
to require considerable technical support before one can operate them 
effectively; they frequently require monitoring data about the state of 
the system which it is unrealistic to expect farmers to collate; and they 
are based on an information platform (the computer) which few farmers 
currently use as a planning tool. Second, most DSSs are justified on the 
basis that they provide information that is useful only for the exception; 
they are rarely applied to improving performance in routine situations 
where the answer is often clear. Thus, the potential gains from using the 
technology are marginalised: to those people who least need assistance 
(because of the extent of their current skills); and to situations where the 
balance between costs and benefits is problematical. The issue is important 
because of the substantial resources currently devoted to this activity; the 
need to allocate increasingly scarce research resources to the development 
of technologies with the highest potential payoff; and the need to think as 
broadly as possible about how we can best use information technology 
to achieve the increasingly urgent goals associated with improved 
agricultural production and long-term sustainability in resource use. 
In this paper, I suggest that the potential for using models of crop and 
soil processes in a direct way, and in isolation, to support routine farm- 
level decision-making is problematical. The products usually cited as 
exemplars of this activity are, on closer examination, poorly justified. The 
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process of R&D which gave rise to agricultural DSSs can only be judged 
inadequate if the criterion of its success is the wide uptake of novel 
information technology by farmers and graziers. 
I also suggest, however, that the spinoffs of DSS development have been 
significant. By bringing researchers and producers together to focus on 
issues of concern to the industry, some progress has been made in 
improving the effectiveness of professional R&D. This has often captured 
the energy and enthusiasm of both parties. We should question the asser- 
tion that the primary benefit of this activity was the production of DSSs 
intended to aid routine decision-making at farm level. The appropriate 
criteria of success lie in the effectiveness of the DSS development process 
in bringing different points of view to bear on an issue of common con- 
cern, not in the need to run process models whenever a routine decision 
has to be made. This change of focus emphasises participation by multiple 
stakeholders, expressing values, in networks for action. The outcome is, 
potentially at least, the improved management of agricultural production 
systems rather than the adoption of a decision aid. The development 
of distinctive criteria for evaluating success in the construction and use 
of crop and soil process models in agricultural R&D, and for DSSs to 
support decision-making in the management of agricultural production 
systems, are urgently needed if we are to capitalise on the gains that we 
have already made. 
I have not attempted a detailed description of the many model-based 
DSSs that are currently available (see e.g. Reynolds, 1993; Stapper, 1993). 
The argument is cast in general terms. The SIRATAC cotton pest man- 
agement model (Hearn et al., 1981) which was used in Australia between 
1980 and 1993, is presented as a case study to illustrate the argument. 
SIRATAC was chosen because of its familiarity; because it is still 
frequently cited in Australia as an example of a successful agricultural 
DSS; and because it was finally abandoned in 1993. 
POOR FIT WITH THE DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS OF DSS 
The phrase ‘DSS’ is used increasingly in a loose sense to indicate any kind 
of decision aid, whether computer-based or not, and whether the problem 
it purports to address is more or less well structured. It has almost become 
synonymous with ‘extension’! However, it generally excludes maps and 
models developed by farmers for their own use, or as part of a Participa- 
tory Rural Appraisal (Lamb, 1993) even though these are particularly 
powerful decision aids and would appear to be a good starting point for 
the development of more elaborate models if such were needed. In this 
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paper, I focus on DSSs that have evolved out of, or in parallel with, 
process models of components of agricultural production systems. 
DSSs were originally developed within an industrial or commercial 
context (Bennett, 1983; Sage, 1991). They were seen as a way of gaining an 
understanding of the implications of different ways of dealing with rela- 
tively unstructured problems, not amenable to the standard algorithms of 
management science. They incorporate models, databases, a query lan- 
guage and an interface. Turban (1993) describes an archetypal DSS. It is 
definitely a computer-based information system. It is often built by the 
people who will use it. It reflects the decision-making style of the decision- 
maker. The decision-maker has control over all aspects of the decision. 
The time to construct a DSS is short (perhaps as short as a few days) and 
it can be modified easily as the problem structure changes. It is a highly 
interactive application for computer-literate people within a complex 
organisation (often hierarchical, certainly with specialised functions). It is 
seen as an adjunct to other procedures. 
This maps poorly onto the characteristics both of agricultural DSSs and 
of the proposed clients of this activity. Decision-making in the routine 
management of broadacre dryland agricultural production systems is suf- 
ficiently well-structured for the use of standard algorithms (Cox, 19930) 
and is often conceptually quite simple. Examples include decisions on the 
best rate of fertiliser to apply, based on estimates of nitrogen deficiency in 
the previous crop, or whether to plant a particular crop based on the 
availability of a planting opportunity at a certain time of the year. 
Admittedly, the outcome is often uncertain, depending, for example, on 
the incidence of in-crop rainfall, but this constitutes background noise to 
the decision problem, and does not indicate a change in model structure. 
There are situations where little is known (for example, the introduction of 
a crop new to a region) and these may provide transient demand for 
decision support. But these situations are already handled in other ways. 
In evaluating a DSS, the focus should be on its marginal contribution to 
achieving improved outcomes. 
An agricultural DSS usually imposes a structure on a decision. This 
may be different from that perceived by the decision-maker (Hofstede, 
1992). Indeed, ‘education’ of farmers is often cited by professional agri- 
culturalists as justification for constructing a DSS, thus further confusing 
DSS technology with computer-aided instruction. Because DSSs are 
computer-based, there is poor correspondence with the decision-making 
style of most agricultural practitioners who, unlike professional research- 
ers, do not generally use computers in this way. The rigidity of most agri- 
cultural DSSs precludes major re-configuration by users even if they had 
access to the source code and sufficient programming skills to do it. There 
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is in any case a need to incorporate the output of a DSS with the many 
other issues not covered by the underlying process models. 
Macpherson & Grant (1989) point out that the use of simulation in 
policy debate is a rhetorical device. Debate is a matter of persuasive com- 
munication. Yet agricultural DSSs are usually constructed as though they 
described the outcome of a course of action in a way that is readily 
accessible and unproblematical. It is unclear whether this is due to the 
deliberate use by professional agriculturalists of argument by authority 
(based on an inaccessible process model), or to the nai’vety of the system 
designers about the everyday practicalities of agricultural production, or 
to the progressive development of a novel technological metaphor based 
on conspicuous production (Badham, 1991). 
The issue is whether professional researchers, trained in reductionist 
science and rewarded primarily for their contribution to better under- 
standing, can be relied upon to specify the system boundaries in a way 
that reflects the constraints and opportunities faced by agricultural prac- 
titioners. The presupposition must be that they cannot. Modelling has 
been done in relative isolation. The focus of professional R&D has not 
been on how best to change client behaviour, but on the justification for a 
prior interest in model construction; not on how best we can solve pro- 
blems of common interest and concern (whether using process models or 
not, to support research or directed behavioural change or conspicuous 
production), but on what applications we can find for our models. In some 
situations, there has been a deliberate attempt to change the behaviour of 
producers (e.g. the use of SIRATAC to encourage producers to adopt the 
principles of Integrated Pest Management, see below). Increasingly, how- 
ever, these tools are proposed to help producers evaluate options (and 
make of them what they will), not to extend the adoption of a preferred 
practice through better understanding of the benefits and costs associated 
with it. 
The proposed use of models in this way is a category mistake (Ryle, 
1963): it conflates different categories of knowledge, and different ways of 
knowing. As Ryle states (p. 19): “The theoretically interesting category- 
mistakes are those made by people who are perfectly competent to apply 
concepts, at least in the situation with which they are familiar, but are still 
liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types 
to which they do not belong.” The management of biological production 
systems is only loosely analogous with the use of an automotive braking 
system: biological systems are characterised by stochasticity, openness and 
equi-finality; the speed of a car is well-controlled by balanced, progressive 
servo-mechanisms. The category mistake is an example of the ‘fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness’ (Whitehead, 1929; see Daly, 1991). 
360 P. G. Cox 
Different ways of using models have been recognised in the operational 
research literature for many years. Thus, Ackoff & Sasieni (1968); p. 89) 
state: “Models are normally thought of as instruments for selecting the 
best (or at least a good) course of action from that set of courses of action 
that is ‘covered’ by the model. However, models have another very 
important use that is frequently overlooked: they can be used heuristically, 
that is, as an instrument of discovery... Many of the most successful 
applications of operations research have involved the use of models to 
uncover possibilities not normally considered in the literature on the rele- 
vant type of theory. The value of such exploration cannot be over- 
emphasized...in most such cases, the course of action is so obviously 
superior to the possibilities that were previously considered, that a model 
is hardly needed to justify their choice.” 
There is poor understanding among researchers of what an agricultural 
DSS does when farmers (or other practitioners - the intended clients of 
the DSS) use it. There is an implicit assumption that a DSS provides the 
best available information, and that this is sufficient justification for its 
development and for promoting its use. This is rarely based on a previous 
understanding of the problems decision-makers face; nor of how they are 
handling them now; nor of how this particular kind of intervention might 
facilitate more effective decision-making behaviour; nor of how it com- 
pares with other ways of doing things. Market research has usually only 
been done after the product has been released, after the developers become 
concerned about its low uptake (e.g. O’Keeffe, 1992) and evaluation of the 
intervention is done poorly, if at all (Finlay & Wilson, 1991). Where this is 
attempted, the conceptual framework is weak. Indeed, it is a very hard 
thing to do (Adelman, 1992; Willcocks, 1994). 
There is, more than ever, the need to pause and think about current 
levels of R&D investment in information technology to support the man- 
agement of agricultural production systems. I echo the remarks of Angel1 
& Smithson (1990) who said: “... our message is not anti-technology per se, 
it is rather that decision makers must re-examine the assumptions under 
which systems are justified, and they must become aware of the risks 
inherent in the introduction of information technology and balance them 
against the benefits.” 
SOME ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF AGRICULTURAL DSS 
If as a society we are serious about using professional researchers and 
scientific knowledge to enhance a process of social change, such as changes 
in the way agricultural production systems are managed, in order to 
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incorporate social objectives in maintaining the stock of natural resources, 
then the provision of information is not likely to be very effective on its 
own. Information is not knowledge, particularly when the information is 
presented in a way that is confusing, embodies a conflicting set of values, 
and fails to recognise the decision-making style of the client group. If we 
are not serious about contributing to social change, why are professional 
researchers so intent on constructing DSSs? 
I propose four issues that demand consideration: the need for an ana- 
lytical phase between model construction and use in a DSS; the use of an 
appropriate resolution in problem definition, model validation and solu- 
tion in relation to the purpose of the activity; the need for changes in 
communication practice between professional researchers, acting as con- 
sultants, and practitioners; and acceptance of greater professional 
responsibility by agricultural researchers. These issues are illustrated by 
the following case study. 
Need for an analytical phase 
Insertion of an analytical phase between the construction of a process 
model and the development of a DSS will often obviate the need for the 
development of a DSS for use by practitioners. The analytical phase will 
indicate the sensitivity of possible outcomes to changes in the way a sys- 
tem is managed, and the implications of alternative courses of action. 
Often, the performance of an agricultural production system will be rela- 
tively insensitive to small changes in the way things are done (Goodwin & 
Wright, 1991); due to the natural homeostasis of biological systems, and 
the availability of opportunities to recover from management mistakes. 
Furthermore, uncertainty about the difference a change in behaviour will 
make (whether derived from uncertainty about initial conditions, or 
parameter estimation, or stochastic inputs, or exogenous events) will often 
mean that the implications of different management options cannot be 
distinguished. In either case, a DSS will be of little value for routine 
decision-making: either there are no differences between alternative actions; 
or we cannot distinguish them; or the differences are not important. 
Resolution, validation and purpose 
The appropriate resolution of process models of agricultural production 
systems is rarely considered by system designers. Validation is usually 
based on a plot of simulated versus actual outcomes over a wide range of 
experimental treatments. This procedure is inadequate if the issue is at a 
finer scale, or in a commercial setting where the noise is much higher. 
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I suggest an optical analogy: it is possible to build a microscope that 
achieves very high magnification, but its resolution is limited by the 
wavelength of the incident radiation used in the apparatus. I suspect that 
the process models on which agricultural DSSs are built have inadequate 
resolution to distinguish much of what interests practitioners. The result is 
empty magnification. There is a mismatch between the resolution of the 
model and its intended purpose. 
Problems with the validation of numerical models in the earth sciences 
are increasingly recognised. Konikow & Bredehoeft (1992) suggest that 
the terms validation and verzjication are misleading, and their use in 
groundwater science should be abandoned in favour of more meaningful 
model-assessment descriptors. Validation and verification are not generic 
activities, but should be designed in relation to the intended use of each 
model; as the use changes, the criteria for assessing whether a model 
works satisfactorily, and contributes to the analysis, also change. Oreskes 
et al. (1994) point out that validation and verification of numerical models 
of natural systems are impossible because such systems are never closed 
and because model results are always non-unique. Models can only be 
evaluated in relative terms; their primary value is heuristic. 
The arguments of these authors are not that we cannot build models of 
open systems (we do this quite happily), only that such models will not 
have a unique, or even widely-accepted, solution. A process model is a 
proposition about how some part of the world might function rather than 
a description of the way it does function, which can often be better han- 
dled using empirical models. Process simulation can assist in the design of 
heuristics for the routine management of agricultural production. They 
are not a replacement for those heuristics. Nor do they replace the need to 
negotiate those heuristics further with relevant stakeholders so they are 
adequately contextualised. The need is for models with a degree of reso- 
lution, appropriately validated, that cope adequately with the emergent 
properties of systems in the context of substantial background noise. This 
argues for simpler, not more complex, models if the interpretation of 
model output is to be done by people other than those who built the 
models. Enough complexity emerges through interaction of the problem 
owners with the problem situation. Current DSS technology, intended to 
support routine decision-making, is over-engineered. 
Communication practice 
The substitution of software products as a proxy for direct communication 
resembles traditional extension; an intermediary is inserted between the 
communicating parties. The DSS, like extension, filters communication 
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both ways. Use of a product as a substitute for communication stifles it. 
Participation and communication together provide a more appropriate 
focus. This change in perspective is captured, to an extent, by the progress 
of the human-centred systems movement (Checkland, 198 1). Computer- 
supported cooperative work (Baecker, 1993) is an emerging metaphor. But 
this has yet to permeate to any significant extent the design of agricultural 
DSSs. There are things to do with models other than build agricultural 
DSSs that few people want, fewer will use, and where the payoff from 
research is correspondingly restricted. 
Professional responsibility 
The language of crop and soil process models, and the management of the 
assumptions on which they are based, are the tools of professional science. 
They can be a powerful way to generate insights, but this requires craft 
skills both to use them in a sensible way and to evaluate suggested out- 
comes critically. Professional researchers are valued in society because 
they have these craft skills. Clients, in general, use a different set of tools 
for different purposes. Not to do what it does best, or at least where it has 
a comparative advantage, by relegating this to a digital assistant, is an 
abdication of responsibility by professional science. We need to be clear to 
whom we, as professional researchers, are accountable. This will mean 
much greater attention to issues of comparative performance with other 
model formulations (including, and especially, those of practitioners) and 
the criteria by which the success of interventions of different kinds are 
established at the margin. 
SIRATAC ~ A CASE STUDY 
SIRATAC, an acronym for CSZRO’ and the New South Wales Depart- 
ment of Agriculture 7’Actics for growing Cotton, was a dial-up computer- 
based tactical crop management system for irrigated cotton. It evolved 
from a prototype constructed by Room (1979) with the purpose of syn- 
thesising research results into a practical integrated management system 
which made best use of the information available. The apparent success of 
SIRATAC in the early 1980s (with 25% adoption by area) has provided a 
benchmark against which other DSSs have been judged. 
SIRATAC was developed initially to help growers make day-to-day 
decisions about the use of insecticides in irrigated cotton. Cotton cannot be 
‘CSIRO is the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
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grown commercially in Australia without chemical control of insect pests. 
This typically costs between A$100 and A$300 per hectare each year. 
Spraying can also result in an increased risk of resistance to insecticides 
developing in pest populations, more frequent outbreaks of secondary pests, 
and heightened public concern about actual and perceived environmental 
pollution with chemical residues. 
SIRATAC tried to reduce the risks associated with pesticide use by 
adopting the following principles of Integrated Pest Management (IPM): 
(i) making maximum use of the natural mortality of cotton pests; (ii) 
whenever possible using ‘soft’ sprays which are not persistent, having a 
minimal effect on beneficial insects, and which kill a narrow range of 
insects; (iii) utilising the natural fruiting habit of the cotton plant which 
produces two to three times more fruit than it can mature and which can 
compensate to a degree for early insect damage by replacing fruit that is 
lost; and (iv) spraying only when pest numbers exceed action thresholds. 
Action thresholds are pest densities above which the value of the damage 
caused is greater than the cost of control. 
The results of field experimentation with the SIRATAC system in the 
early 1980s excited a core group of potential users into lobbying CSIRO 
to commercialise the prototype as quickly as possible. They argued that 
commercialisation, by bringing the technology to market earlier, would 
focus the research effort. The researchers acquiesced in the belief that 
SIRATAC would be an appropriate conduit for the extension of research 
results. The program was intended to be a decision aid for the professional 
pest manager, not a computerised replacement. The SIRATAC system 
has been described in outline at various stages in its development 
(Room, 1979; Hearn et al., 1981; Brook & Hearn, 1983, 1990; Ives et al., 
1984; Hearn, 1987; Ives & Hearn, 1987; Macadam, 1988; Hearn & Brook, 
1989). 
The area managed using SIRATAC increased steadily during the early 
1980s. The demand for a lo-fold expansion in 198 l/82 was beyond both 
the resources and the terms of reference of research. The three organisa- 
tions that ginned and marketed the crop in New South Wales and 
Queensland set up a company, SIRATAC Ltd, to make SIRATAC 
available on a commercial basis to all cotton growers (Brook & Hearn, 
1983). 
Although SIRATAC Ltd was achieving market success, it became 
apparent by 1985 that a ceiling in the adoption of the technology had been 
reached at about 25% (by area) of the industry. This fell far short of the 
60% level of acceptance envisaged by the architects of SIRATAC Ltd. 
Consequently, the company only just remained solvent (with a peak 
annual revenue of about A$0.5 m) for most of its life. The SIRATAC 
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technology was ‘leaking over the fence’ to non-SIRATAC managed 
properties. Savings in insecticide applications became harder to demon- 
strate as pest management improved in the industry. Commercial viability 
depended on continued innovation. The SIRATAC Plus project was a 
response to this. 
Researchers were interested in improving the quality of the decisions 
produced by the SIRATAC program and in providing an explanation 
capability to support those decisions. Re-implementation of the system 
would reduce the burden of maintaining the FORTRAN code which by 
this time had become highly convoluted. The CSIRO Division of Infor- 
mation Technology (DIT) persuaded the cotton researchers to re-imple- 
ment the SIRATAC system using an expert system language (OPS5), a 
relational database, a data dictionary and a complete re-specification of 
the FORTRAN models (Coulomb et al., 1988). The original interface 
system was to be written in RALLY, a fourth generation screen language 
for DEC VT100 terminals and emulators. During field trials with 
RALLY, it became apparent that the VAX minicomputers being used by 
SIRATAC could not provide an adequate response time for interactive 
use. A front-end data entry system was proposed to provide a fast 
windowed environment compatible with modern microcomputer interfaces. 
The SIRATAC Plus re-implementation project ran for over 4 years and 
was grossly over-budget and behind schedule for its entire life. The even- 
tual prototype that was delivered by DIT was vastly larger and more 
complicated than the original SIRATAC FORTRAN system, but pro- 
vided less biological and management functionality. The response time 
was 60 times slower, and the company could not afford enough mainframe 
power to run the system. The microcomputer front-end was cumbersome 
and tedious. In 1990, the project was abandoned. The central mini- 
computer route was an evolutionary dead-end. The failure to provide 
an enhancement and replacement for SIRATAC further contributed to 
SIRATAC Ltd’s demise. 
DIT had seen SIRATAC Plus as an opportunity to develop an industry 
demonstration of systems engineering. It was even more complex in 
its inception than the original SIRATAC code (partly in relation to the 
specification of its expert system, partly to the requirement to handle a 
graphical user interface down a telephone line to access a central database, 
and partly in its use of a relational database and a data dictionary). This 
emphasis derived from a lack of congruence between the goals of the 
system engineers and those of the biological researchers. The researchers 
had unwittingly allowed SIRATAC to be hijacked. The opportunity to 
simplify the technology was not taken. This was a conceptual problem 
which underpinned both SIRATAC Plus and the original SIRATAC model. 
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In 1986, a research team from the University of Western Sydney (pre- 
viously Hawkesbury Agricultural College) conducted a qualitative in-depth 
analysis of the attitudes to and perceptions of SIRATAC and SIRATAC 
Ltd within the Australian cotton industry (Macadam et al., 1990). This 
was precipitated by increasing unease about the role of SIRATAC 
and SIRATAC Ltd. Some of their findings related to the design of the 
SIRATAC technology. 
Although SIRATAC users might have saved up to two sprays com- 
pared with non-users when the methodology was first introduced in the 
early 1980s this difference did not persist. The justification for continuing 
to support a computerised pest management system was far from clear 
when similar patterns of pesticide use could be generated without using a 
computer at all. Some growers disagreed with the types and timing of 
chemicals recommended by SIRATAC: expensive chemicals were sug- 
gested when they felt that a cheaper one would do; and SIRATAC did not 
recommend sprays as often as growers felt comfortable with. Thus, sprays 
were selected on the basis of criteria which were not congruent with those 
of growers. In practice, the early season Heliothis thresholds used by 
SIRATAC to precipitate a spray application were progressively reduced. 
Nevertheless, many growers felt that they were continually overriding the 
system and subsequently abandoned it. 
Some growers believed that the use of dynamic (i.e. high early season) 
thresholds produced late crops. They rated production of an early matur- 
ing crop as a high priority. Subsequent work by Cox et al. (1991), using 
the SIRATAC models, confirmed that placing a high value on earliness 
would significantly reduce optimal early season Heliothis thresholds. 
Furthermore, the underlying simulation models may not have been accu- 
rately tracking the compensation of the cotton crop in response to early 
insect damage (Brook et al., 1992a,b,c). SIRATAC abandoned dynamic 
thresholds for Heliothis in Phase 2 of crop development (i.e. after flower 
initiation) during the 1988/89 cotton season. 
Despite the fact that the area managed with SIRATAC was at a histori- 
cal high, SIRATAC Ltd went into voluntary liquidation in June 1989 in 
response to a projected declining market share under existing pricing arrange- 
ments, industry political problems and projected cash flow difficulties. A 
sizeable minority of growers still wanted to use the SIRATAC computer 
program. An informal SIRATAC User Group (SUG) was formed to run the 
program for a few more seasons until a microcomputer replacement was 
available. This arrangement operated successfully for four seasons (1989/ 
90 until 1992/93). Field support of the system was no longer available and 
a research moratorium on SIRATAC development meant that only minor 
changes to the code were made. The User Group ceased operation in 1993. 
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The failure of the SIRATAC Plus reimplementation prompted a parallel 
activity at the CSIRO Cotton Research Unit. The goal was to achieve 
similar functionality on a microcomputer. A prototype product, entomo- 
LOGIC, was written in HyperCard for an Apple Macintosh. entomoLOGIC 
used production rules to capture the knowledge in SIRATAC. Decon- 
struction of the SIRATAC code generated about 60 rules governing pesti- 
cide use. This number appeared too small to justify the use of expert 
systems technology. In fact, the number of rules that could be fired at any 
one time was substantially less than 60 because only certain chemicals 
could be used at certain times of the year (as defined by the Insecticide 
Resistance Management Strategy, see below). In field trials, entomoLOGIC 
successfully mimicked SIRATAC spray recommendations except in situa- 
tions where the size of the pest population was projected forward by the 
insect population model in SIRATAC. In practice, these situations could 
have been handled by adjustments to the rules rather than to projected pest 
numbers. 
The issue was not about the most effective way to manipulate a complex 
knowledge base, but had much more to do with the mundane activities of 
routine record keeping. The prototype of entomoLOGZC dispensed with 
both the crop model (which no longer contributed to changes in decision- 
making after dynamic thresholds were abandoned) and insect development 
models (on the basis that this could be captured adequately using mod- 
ifications to the rule base). Nevertheless, when entomoLOGZC was released 
in 1993, it did incorporate process models (McKewen et al., 1994). 
Considerable loyalty to SIRATAC, and the people involved, persists. 
This makes criticism difficult. The balance between loyalty (reinforcing the 
status quo), exit (walking away from it because it seems too difficult, or too 
costly, to change) and voice (speaking out with a view to changing the 
situation) (Hirschmann, 1970) is always a difficult judgement call. Partici- 
pants in the SIRATAC story still find this hard. Yet there is much to learn 
from their experience. 
DISCUSSION 
The ambiguous record of modelling R&D 
Modelling of agricultural production and land use systems (at crop, farm 
and regional levels, and incorporating both ecological and economic per- 
spectives) has become more complex, sophisticated and accessible in the 
last 15 years since the microcomputer revolution. Simulation modelling is 
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increasingly seen as essential for professional research in ecological eco- 
nomics (Maxwell & Randall, 1989; Costanza et al., 1993). Several reviews 
over that period (Monteith, 1981; Bennett & Macpherson, 1985; Seligman, 
1990; Philip, 1991), however, have questioned the value of such sophisti- 
cated crop and soil process models as a means of bringing about change in 
producers’ behaviour. According to Seligman, crop modelling has not yet 
matured to a stage where its function and utility are no longer open to 
question. We have still not addressed the concerns so eloquently expressed 
by Bennett & Macpherson (op. cit.) 10 years ago. The progressive incor- 
poration of these models into decision support systems for practical 
application in the routine management of agricultural production only 
serves to emphasise this blind spot. Thus, Hamilton et al. (1991) propose 
that computer-based decision aids have not been oversold, just under- 
developed. Whereas Stapper (1993) asks whether these are applications in 
search of users, rather than a response to users in search of solutions. The 
answer is somewhere between these extremes. 
The assumptions of DSS 
Current agricultural DSSs are based on the notion that the performance 
of agricultural production systems is limited by a shortage of information 
of the kind that professional science can provide, and/or by defects in the 
decision-making processes of resource management practitioners. I sug- 
gest that there is little evidence to support either of these two supposi- 
tions. Practitioners often do not need the detailed process understanding 
that researchers value in order to operate effectively in the world. Indeed, 
this notion of a DSS is at odds with the standard concept of a DSS in 
non-agricultural situations: as a computer-based information system that 
allows advantage to be taken of data resources, and means of processing 
data, that are too computationally demanding to be undertaken manu- 
ally; and to provide a structure to help the user to work systematically 
through an issue. DSS technology, because of its complexity and lack of 
transparency, can hide important conflicts that need to be resolved on 
other than technological grounds. There may only be a very limited sub- 
set of agricultural decision problems where DSS technology can usefully 
contribute to improvements in routine decision-making. 
That something has clearly gone wrong in the development and appli- 
cation of simulation models of crop and soil processes to address 
important issues in the management of agricultural production has been 
noted in several thesis studies (e.g. Hofstede, 1992; Leeuwis, 1993; 
Schmidt, 1994). Hofstede calls for researchers to have ‘modesty in 
modelling’. 
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The situations of which I am aware where DSSs have had some impact at 
farm level have certain characteristics: either they are embedded in a much 
richer cultural process of interaction between professional agriculturalists 
and farmers, or they are generic tools. An example of the first includes 
MIDAS (Kingwell & Pannell, 1986) a whole-farm linear programming 
model which has been widely used in Western Australia in group 
extension activities. An example of the second includes the success of 
workshops on the use of accounting packages and spreadsheets by the 
Queensland Department of Primary Industries in which farmers build 
their own models. This echoes the experience of Collins (1990) who points 
out the need to embed expert systems (or computer technology of any 
kind, including calculators) into a social process. 
The early success of SIRATAC can be attributed to these concomitant 
social processes: the consultancy efforts of SIRATAC Ltd (a grower- 
supported organisation set up to market the technology) provided sub- 
stantial industry ownership of the technology. The success of SUG 
following the collapse of SIRATAC Ltd also supports this idea. SIRATAC 
did change communication practice between professional researchers and 
practitioners and facilitated the introduction of IPM (Cox, 19936). In this 
sense, it was a facilitating technology, despite the mismatch between 
model complexity and the issue of making spray recommendations. In 
other situations, DSS technology is accepted as an alternative to social 
interaction, as a replacement for constructive dialogue. 
Communication practice in DSS development and use 
However, even within SIRATAC, the DSS framework was set by the 
researchers. Inputs from producers were accepted only within the context 
of that framework: the argument was about the appropriate level at which 
thresholds should be set, and the way in which SIRATAC should be 
financed. Fine adjustments were being made by the computer model to the 
estimation of insect pest numbers that precipitated a spray decision, 
but little attention was paid to the value of these given the uncertainty 
associated with poor crop monitoring and insect scouting, and different 
perceptions of potential yield. SIRATAC was a decision-making system, 
not a decision-support system. It provided limited opportunity for a user 
to investigate the implications of using spray thresholds other than those 
recommended because part of the justification of SIRATAC was 
the assertion of higher thresholds than would otherwise have been used 
in order to restrict the development of resistance in the insect population. 
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In the language of Senge’s system archetypes (Senge et al., 1994), 
SIRATAC followed a ‘Shifting the Burden’ template; it diverted attention 
away from the real source of the problem which becomes weaker as less 
attention is paid to it. 
Evaluation 
The output utility of a modelling exercise is the key issue, but little is 
usually done to check that it exists or that it is worth the effort (Bennett & 
Macpherson, 1985). Johnston et al. (1992) considered the payoff to the 
research investment in the SIRATAC pest management system. This 
analysis was flawed by: insufficient recognition that the same pesticide 
regimen was achieved by many farmers without running the SIRATAC 
model; the failure to distinguish the value of IPM technology (spray on 
threshold, and the rules associated with the Insecticide Resistance 
Management Strategy) from the value of the SIRATAC model used to 
generate specific recommendations and extend the technology; the use of 
an excessively remote planning horizon over which to accumulate benefits; 
and failure to incorporate the costs of any lost production that might have 
resulted through the use of a truncated spray regimen, particularly given 
research results suggesting that compensation for early insect damage did 
not occur at high yield levels (Brook et al., 1992a,b,c). 
In other situations, computer-based technology is not required in order 
to implement a programme of integrated pest management (e.g. Van de 
Fliert, 1993). The essence of the SIRATAC system had earlier been cap- 
tured by Philippino researchers using a simple peg board. Many decision 
tools for pest management are available (Norton & Mumford, 1993). It 
was far from clear that the marginal contribution of the SIRATAC tech- 
nology in terms of improved routine decision-making behaviour justified 
the large marginal cost of continuing to maintain and update the model. 
There were no procedures in place to terminate the technology once its 
potential to facilitate the introduction of IPM had been exploited. 
It was this situation that prompted the soft systems study by Macadam 
et al. (1990). There was little real possibility that a soft systems inter- 
vention would ameliorate the mess. The professional researchers were not 
committed to this kind of activity and rejected the conceptual framework 
on which it was based. This lack of sympathy for Soft Systems Method- 
ology (Checkland, 1981) was based on ignorance of the problematical 
nature of operations research in an industrial and commercial context. 
Researchers were isolated, poorly informed about recent developments in 
systems thinking (especially the critique of hard systems and the emer- 
gence of the human-centred systems movement), excessively protective of 
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their first shot at solving the problem, vulnerable to the hype of systems 
engineers because of the lack of a marginal perspective, and unwilling to 
entertain the notion that the technology had already run its course. 
Unwarranted escalation of organisational commitment 
The development of organisational inertia, even to the extent of escalation 
of commitment, has been noted in other contexts, for example, British 
Columbia’s decision to host Expo 86 in Vancouver (Ross & Staw, 1986) 
and the Shoreham nuclear power plant (Ross & Staw, 1993). Ross & Staw 
(1993) present 12 propositions on escalation. Whereas all of these are 
potentially applicable to this case, three are particularly pertinent: 
1. The more external political forces become aligned with a project, the 
more dtficult it will be for the initiating organisation to withdraw from 
the course of action. This applied to the calls for early commerciali- 
sation of SIRATAC by growers (which led to the setting up of 
SIRATAC Ltd); the need for SIRATAC Ltd to develop a new 
product, and interest by the DIT in a demonstration project (which 
led to the abortive development of SIRATAC Plus); and the support 
of SUG for a microcomputer application that incorporated the 
original SIRATAC models (which led to the development, and 
increasing complexity, of entomoLOGZC’). 
2. The more ambiguous and changing the economics of a project, the 
more dt@icult it will be for an organisation to extricate itself from 
the selected course of action. The marginal contribution of the 
SIRATAC model to routine pest management decisions was not 
critically evaluated. Indeed, it was considered as an industry 
standard which did not need to be justified in economic terms. It is 
clear that it did facilitate the introduction of IPM in the early 1980s 
but these gains were short-lived because the spray recommendations 
could be adequately generated without the model. The sunk costs, 
both technical and institutional, were a source of organisational 
inertia, preventing rapid adaptation to a changing situation in the 
Australian cotton industry. 
3. Escalation problems are especially likely to occur when managers ven- 
ture ,far ,from their areas of expertise or when technological changes 
cause such major changes in an organisational context that previously. 
learned procedures and decision checks are no longer applicable. 
There were no controls in place that would make SIRATAC self- 
terminating. There was no monitoring of the effectiveness of 
SIRATAC in generating improved practices, compared with other 
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ways of doing things. If SIRATAC had terminated in the early 
198Os, it would have avoided many of these problematical issues. 
As it was, it was hijacked by technical specialists in the emerging 
technology of decision support and expert systems. 
Some specific propositions about the case study 
I would like to suggest some additional propositions to help us learn from, 
and move on, from the SIRATAC experience. 
The sources of technological controversy surrounding SIRATAC were not 
unusual 
Throughout the 1980s the SIRATAC technology had become increas- 
ingly controversial and the source of serious confrontation within the 
Australian cotton industry. The major sources of technological con- 
troversy surrounding SIRATAC relate to the justification for spraying on 
threshold, what those thresholds should be, the choice of insecticide, and 
the choice of information technology to manage that justification. There 
was a research agenda to reduce pesticide use overall, and the use of 
particular pesticides. The information technology selected (the SIRATAC 
models, accessed remotely) was far from transparent and very much in 
the research domain. There are similarities with Rtidig’s (Rtidig, 1993) 
description of the sources of technological controversy in the nuclear 
power industry. First, the subversive character of the scientific process 
itself; science is about seeing the world in new ways, and identifying 
opportunities to change it. Both nuclear power and SIRATAC were sci- 
ence-based technologies. Second, the impossibility of evaluating a tech- 
nology under full operational conditions. This applies almost as much to 
agricultural DSSs as to Rudig’s example of nuclear power because of the 
variability of the response in different years and at different locations. 
Third, if the level of complexity of the technology makes it difficult to 
evaluate easily from the outside - again as applicable to agricultural 
DSSs as nuclear power because of the inaccessibility of the underlying 
model base. 
There was an alternative technology 
The implementation of the Insecticide Resistance Management (IRM) 
Strategy, following the discovery of resistance to pyrethroids at Emerald in 
early 1983, provided an alternative to SIRATAC (Cox & Forrester, 1992). 
This depended on restricting the use of certain classes of insecticide to 
certain times of the year. The IRM is not a computer-based technology. It 
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depends for its success on participation, negotiation and commitment by 
many sectors of the cotton industry including growers, input suppliers and 
researchers. It is a social technology. The returns to this technology, how- 
ever, appear to have been substantial. It has not met many of the problems 
faced by SIRATAC. It is perceived to be an appropriate industry-level 
response to an industry-wide problem: the management of the stock of 
susceptibility in the insect population to current chemical insecticides that 
are valued on other grounds (cost, selectivity, non-persistence). 
The role qf SIRATAC, like that of the alternative technology, was 
primarily social 
I have argued elsewhere (Cox, 19936) that the main function of SIRATAC 
was as a source of legitimation for IPM among cotton-growers and, later, 
for the Australian cotton industry in its long-running dispute with envir- 
onmentalists who were concerned with excessive and inappropriate use of 
insecticides - not to support routine decision-making on pesticide selec- 
tion and use. Its portrayal as a successful DSS is misleading in situations 
where this kind of power relationship is absent. Perhaps the illusion of its 
success had to be maintained for the industry to accomplish the introduc- 
tion of IPM and cope with the environmental lobby. But even in this case. 
the particular approach used by SIRATAC (the assertion of recommended 
practices based on an algorithmic approach, poorly justified at the margin 
compared with simpler, more transparent, more empowering approaches) 
remains problematical. 
The quality of information is important, but poorly understood 
I accept that knowledge is becoming more significant than either wealth or 
violence in shaping power relationships in society (Tofler, 1990); that 
knowledge is increasingly important as a factor of production in economic 
processes compared with land, labour and capital (Drucker, 1993); and the 
possibility that substituting knowledge (embodied as human capital) for 
natural resources might also be necessary for sustainable development. as 
suggested by Pearce et al. (1989). In these situations, however, it becomes 
all the more important to be clear that not all knowledge is equally useful, 
irrespective of who is using it and how it is applied, and to develop design 
criteria for knowledge transformations. This point is also stressed. in a 
wider context, by Funtowicz & Ravetz (1990). 
The tendency for scientific knowledge to override practical knowledge 
impedes communication 
The confrontation between episteme and techne (Marglin, 1992) and our 
failure to integrate these, lies at the root of these pathological R&D 
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processes. Roughly, episteme corresponds with the scientific knowledge 
of professional researchers; techne with the practical knowledge of prac- 
titioners (such as farmers). It is the gulf between these two systems of 
knowledge that we need to bridge. The development and promotion of 
agricultural DSSs by professional researchers (even worse, their use in an 
attempt to legitimate underlying R&D practice) is further evidence of the 
tendency of episteme to override techne. This is understandable because 
of the nature of the different worlds that scientists and farmers live in, 
and their differential access to technology. The increasingly urgent ques- 
tion is rather about how to bring these two perspectives together to 
facilitate the achievement of purposeful change in both. 
DSS technology can be used to help dejine quality and to capture d@erent 
interpretations 
The underlying modelling skills may be used in an attempt to bring 
episteme and techne together: these confront each other in the context of 
a shared experiment. But, as Peters (1992) points out, and as shown in 
the SIRATAC example, it is important not to listen to customers at 
times. This supports Shulman’s contention (Shulman, 1993) that R&D 
should be neither technology-driven nor market-driven, but market- 
relevant. 
In my experience, the construction of agricultural DSSs, and attempts 
to use them as interventions in social systems in order to achieve targeted 
change in human behaviour, is problematical for several reasons. It rein- 
forces the separation of professional researchers from their clients because 
this activity is largely conducted in isolation and in esoteric terms. It con- 
fuses different ways of looking at the world, and tries to impose a world 
view which (while appropriate for scientific understanding) is largely 
incompatible with the more pressing requirements of practitioners. In 
failing to recognise the scope for algorithmic compression in the formula- 
tion of practical recommendations (even if through the deconstruction of 
professional models), agricultural DSSs represent an abdication of pro- 
fessional responsibility and a failure of accountability. Agricultural DSSs 
have been a misapplied metaphor. 
However, this is not strictly a problem peculiar to DSS technology. It is 
a symptom of a deeper malaise affecting communication among different 
stakeholder groups (research, extension, farmers): provision of a DSS 
becomes a substitute for communication, rather than contributing to the 
identification, development and realisation of novel possibilities. There is 
a danger that DSSs will become a whipping boy - that is not what I want. 
There is scope for doing things differently, and DSS technology can be 
part of the solution. 
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RE-NEGOTIATING THE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS IN DSS 
DEVELOPMENT 
The process of developing agricultural DSSs in recent years has changed 
both the way in which agricultural science is done and the expectations of 
industry. But the experience has been ambiguous and can be viewed in 
different ways. 
DSS research has been associated with the formation of systems teams 
which became the nucleus for state and national cooperation and who 
shared data and ideas. It provided a framework for the integration of 
research and extension (and, to a much more limited extent, grower) 
experience. It led to the development of operational systems for informa- 
tion products of other kinds, e.g. drought alert. Systems analysis, using a 
DSS applied to the real world, provided an honest and responsible test of 
the underlying science. No-one else had the courage or the stupidity to see 
if scientific predictions worked in the field. Our science, by itself, will not 
be good enough to bring about resolution or change where it is needed. 
But progress can be made through conflict, and conflict is sometimes 
necessary, especially when confronting entrenched views. DSS research 
has a track record of dragging these conflicts into the open, even if the 
DSS is destroyed in the process. 
Agricultural science is not science unless it predicts, and tests its 
predictions. DSS research made this test explicit. If the prediction is 
wrong, then the model is wrong and knowledge advances. If we stop DSS 
research, we stop the most active test of our understanding of the beha- 
viour of complex systems. DSS research has been a very humbling 
experience for science because it shows clearly where science cannot 
predict, and how lacking in understanding we are. DSS research brings 
scientists and industry together. SIRATAC was (at least in its early years) 
an outstanding example of contact between industry and science. 
Many problems can be solved very well without DSSs, and the marginal 
benefit does not justify the cost of developing and maintaining them. 
However, in other applications, it is doubtful whether DSSs yet have 
sufficient resolution to be used in the way we want, for example in order to 
allow professional researchers to contribute to farmers’ experiments (Cox 
et al., 1993). The one path (use of information technology in an attempt to 
buttress an outdated linear model of agricultural extension) is a blind 
alley. The other (use of DSS construction as a process tool) can offer 
potential for substantial payoffs because of the way it broadens the scope 
for shared experience and captures the synergy associated with combining 
perspectives. 
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The construction, application, and modification of models of various 
kinds may help to bridge the gap between traditional systems of scientific 
thought and emerging systems of action (Cox et al., 1994). Professional 
researchers are only just beginning to explore the potential for introducing 
wider social arrangements within our systems modelling in order to stimu- 
late both thought and action. But it does not follow that the researchers’ 
models are the most effective vehicle for effecting directed change in the 
management of agricultural production systems. They might suggest fruit- 
ful avenues to explore, or the probable shape of response surfaces. The 
exploitation of such insights may best be handled in ways other than by 
rehearsing the representations through which they were developed. I pro- 
pose working with parallel models and multiple representations, not the 
abolition of all modelling activities. 
My main concern is not that DSS technology has failed to live up to 
initial expectations, but that the underlying skills in systems analysis have 
not been adequately exploited. The side-effects associated with the devel- 
opment of some significant DSS technologies have sometimes been bene- 
ficial and significant, but the opportunity to learn from these, and move on, 
has not been taken. It is the benefits associated with DSS development that 
we need to capture again and again, not the unthinking replication of arte- 
facts that do not do anything very much. It is time to renegotiate the criteria 
for success in DSS research, and to begin to value DSSs as process tools 
rather than unwanted artefacts. Information technology, including DSSs, 
can make a vital contribution to help address the increasingly urgent need 
for business process re-engineering (Champy, 1995) in agricultural R,D&E. 
The criteria for success should not be related to the number of units of a 
DSS sold because, as I have argued, this is an inappropriate use of the 
underlying modelling skills. Rather, they should relate to the critical 
insights gained through improved communication of the different perspec- 
tives of researcher and farmer. The beneficial outcomes of model-based 
research will come from the use of DSS technology to support participatory 
processes to design better (more productive, more sustainable) agricultural 
production systems, not in the routine (and unthinking) output of the same 
models in an attempt to influence the behaviour of others not involved in 
their development. 
This shifts the focus to the joint responsibility to generate, test and imple- 
ment critical insights in an effective, efficient and expeditious manner, and 
away from the provision of mundane management tools with no particular 
message or computational advantage. The short life of many DSSs may then 
be evidence of success (if desired change has been quickly achieved), not 
failure. Consideration can be focussed on the timely termination of an 
intervention, rather than how to endure an ongoing commitment to a 
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technology once it has achieved what it set out to do. The tendencies 
towards escalation of commitment, and to ever-increasing complexity, are 
curtailed. The trick is to do this while simultaneously capturing the 
primary benefits of participation in modelling. 
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